ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of the Ukraine-Russia War on Philippine foreign policy. It observes that Russia's invasion of Ukraine created the widespread idea that China might emulate its strategic partner on how to deal with an irredentist claim by using force against Taiwan. This alarmed the Duterte Administration at the time it was shifting policy towards China from appeasement to limited hard balancing. This policy aims to constrain China's maritime expansion in the South China Sea by building up the Philippine military's external defence capabilities, maintaining its alliance with the United States, and making security arrangements with other middle powers like South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The outbreak of the Ukraine-Russian War further pushed the Duterte administration to this policy of limited hard balancing towards China. This was shown by President Duterte's decision to strengthen the country's security relations with the U.S. In conclusion, the article notes that the current Marcos Administration has followed its predecessor's footsteps in applying a policy of limited hard balancing policy towards the revisionist powers in the 20th century.
ABSTRACT
The past few years have seen an emergence of populist leaders around the world, who have not only accrued but also maintained support despite rampant criticism, governance failures, and the ongoing COVID pandemic. The Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte is the best illustration of this trend, with approval ratings rarely dipping below 80 percent. What explains his high levels of robust public support? We argue that Duterte is an ethnopopulist who uses ethnic appeals in combination with insider vs. outsider rhetoric to garner and maintain public support. Moreover, we argue that ethnic affiliation is a main driver of support for Duterte, and more important than alternative factors such as age, education, gender, or urban vs. rural divides. We provide evidence of Duterte's marriage of ethnic and populist appeals, then evaluate whether ethnicity predicts support for Duterte, using 15 rounds of nationally representative public opinion data. Identifying with a non-Tagalog ethnicity (like Duterte) leads to an 8 percent increase in approval for Duterte, significantly larger than any other explanatory factor. Among Duterte supporters, a non-Tagalog ethnicity is associated with 19 percent increase in strong versus mild support. Ethnicity is the only positive and significant result, suggesting that it strongly explains why Duterte's support remains robust. Alternative explanations, such as social desirability bias and alternative policy considerations, do not explain our results.
ABSTRACT
The past few years have seen an emergence of populist leaders around the world, who have not only accrued but also maintained support despite rampant criticism, governance failures, and the ongoing COVID pandemic. The Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte is the best illustration of this trend, with approval ratings rarely dipping below 80 percent. What explains his high levels of robust public support? We argue that Duterte is an ethnopopulist who uses ethnic appeals in combination with insider vs. outsider rhetoric to garner and maintain public support. Moreover, we argue that ethnic affiliation is a main driver of support for Duterte, and more important than alternative factors such as age, education, gender, or urban vs. rural divides. We provide evidence of Duterte's marriage of ethnic and populist appeals, then evaluate whether ethnicity predicts support for Duterte, using 15 rounds of nationally representative public opinion data. Identifying with a non-Tagalog ethnicity (like Duterte) leads to an 8 percent increase in approval for Duterte, significantly larger than any other explanatory factor. Among Duterte supporters, a non-Tagalog ethnicity is associated with 19 percent increase in strong versus mild support. Ethnicity is the only positive and significant result, suggesting that it strongly explains why Duterte's support remains robust. Alternative explanations, such as social desirability bias and alternative policy considerations, do not explain our results.
ABSTRACT
The Philippines started 2021 with a temporary relief as the arrival of limited COVID-19 vaccine supplies ushered in the government's launch of its national inoculation programme. However, the periodic surge of COVID-19 cases exposed the constant inadequacies of the Philippine pandemic response, straining once again the country's struggling healthcare system and obstructing the path to economic recovery. With the Filipinos still enduring the pandemic, the government became embroiled in various allegations of corruption and cronyism over the utilization of pandemic funds, which sparked public outcry. President Rodrigo Duterte responded by attacking constitutionally independent agencies that scrutinized the executive branch's alleged excesses, partiality, and incompetence. The national government's policies that further eroded the fragile Philippine democracy were also apparent in how the state agents were increasingly cracking down on the country's civic space, targeting left-leaning activists and the media. The year under review also captured the preparations and manoeuvring of the country's dominant political forces for the 2022 presidential election. Moreover, it saw fresh trajectories and dilemmas in Philippine foreign relations. China's maritime incursions tested Philippines-China relations despite the latter's generous pandemic aid. Conversely, China's increasing threat and the demand for COVID-19 vaccines prompted the Philippines to re-establish its ties with the United States. Finally, the International Criminal Court's decision to investigate Duterte's controversial drug war, albeit temporarily halted, might pave the way for a comprehensive international probe into the Philippines' deteriorating human rights situation. These key intertwining developments in the year under review would cement the legacy of Duterte's populist regime as he prepares to leave the presidency next year.
ABSTRACT
The Philippines started 2021 with a temporary relief as the arrival of limited COVID-19 vaccine supplies ushered in the government’s launch of its national inoculation programme. However, the periodic surge of COVID-19 cases exposed the constant inadequacies of the Philippine pandemic response, straining once again the country’s struggling healthcare system and obstructing the path to economic recovery. With the Filipinos still enduring the pandemic, the government became embroiled in various allegations of corruption and cronyism over the utilization of pandemic funds, which sparked public outcry. President Rodrigo Duterte responded by attacking constitutionally independent agencies that scrutinized the executive branch’s alleged excesses, partiality, and incompetence. The national government’s policies that further eroded the fragile Philippine democracy were also apparent in how the state agents were increasingly cracking down on the country’s civic space, targeting left-leaning activists and the media. The year under review also captured the preparations and manoeuvring of the country’s dominant political forces for the 2022 presidential election. Moreover, it saw fresh trajectories and dilemmas in Philippine foreign relations. China’s maritime incursions tested Philippines-China relations despite the latter’s generous pandemic aid. Conversely, China’s increasing threat and the demand for COVID-19 vaccines prompted the Philippines to re-establish its ties with the United States. Finally, the International Criminal Court’s decision to investigate Duterte’s controversial drug war, albeit temporarily halted, might pave the way for a comprehensive international probe into the Philippines’ deteriorating human rights situation. These key intertwining developments in the year under review would cement the legacy of Duterte’s populist regime as he prepares to leave the presidency next year. © Viella s.r.l. & Associazione Asia Maior.
ABSTRACT
Vaccine nationalism and its implications to vaccine supply were a huge concern globally when COVID-19 vaccines first became available in 2021. At the time, vaccine supply was limited and it was difficult for many countries around the world to get adequate supply of the COVID-19 vaccine to inoculate their people. At its most benign, vaccine nationalism delayed the access of poorer countries to vaccines that are widely considered as the long-term solution to the COVID-19 pandemic. Poorer countries needed to resort to diplomacy to wrangle early access to vaccine supply from vaccine-producing countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and others. In particular, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte leveraged his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States and the need for Filipino nurses by countries like the United Kingdom and Germany to secure early access to COVID-19 vaccines. It all seems trivial now (in 2022) because of better global vaccine supply, but in 2021 when countries scrambled for access to scarce COVID-19 vaccines, Rodrigo Duterte leveraged the Philippines’ assets to gain early access to vaccine supply. © 2022, Busan University of Foreign Studies. All rights reserved.
ABSTRACT
Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Republic of the Philippines, has been heavily criticized by the local and international media, primarily for his brutal anti-drugs campaign and suppression of political opposition and journalists. Nevertheless, despite controversial decisions, Duterte remains, as surveys show, extremely popular among Filipinos. In this context, this study aims at answering the following questions: 1. What are the sources of the popularity of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines? 2. What are the mechanisms of legitimation of his actions? Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the differences between legitimation, popularity, support, and trust, the article concludes by pointing out a combination of structural, situational, personal, and technological factors that impact his popularity.
ABSTRACT
The article examines the main issues and events that defined 2021. It looks at the Duterte government's key domestic and foreign policies, as well as its successes and failures in addressing new and existing challenges. The article finds that while there had been some accomplishments, Duterte falls short in fulfilling most of his 2016 campaign promises. However, despite Duterte's shortcomings, his popularity remains high, although it remains to be seen if this will carry over to next year's elections and whether or not his legacies will endure. Keywords © 2022 Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
ABSTRACT
This article uses a feminist lens to examine Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and former United States President Donald Trump’s responses to COVID-19. It argues that both populist leaders mobilised masculinity as a resource in statecraft. Both initially responded to the pandemic with dismissiveness and denialism. For the rest of his term, Trump diminished the harms of COVID and emphasised ‘protecting the economy’. Duterte, however, eventually embraced the fear of COVID, imposed a strict lockdown, and secured emergency powers. This article first analyses differences in the masculinities the two politicians performed. It then explores how this performance of masculinity contributed to structuring public discourses in relation to the pandemic and situates it in neoliberal governance more broadly. For example, the performance of invincibility constructed others’ vulnerability and illness as an individual weakness rather than socially and relationally produced. Trump’s co-optation of the language of freedom encouraged protests against health measures and positioned medical experts as the ‘real threat’. In contrast, Duterte’s securitised approach made it difficult for citizens to protest repressive laws enacted by his government. Duterte’s ‘war on COVID’ was marked by his demand for obedience and discipline, thereby constituting anyone who questioned the harmful effects of a police-led lockdown as a threat to national security. Finally, the article reflects on the ways China’s growing role in global politics affects notions and practices of populist masculinities. Both leaders flexed diplomatic masculinity differently in relation to China: Duterte touted his personal closeness to China as a path to securing resources for the Philippines, while Trump’s vilification of China constructed COVID as a ‘foreign enemy’ as opposed to a crisis he was responsible for. Ultimately, these masculine responses undermined dissent and centred muscularity, either in the form of individual resilience or securitisation and policing, as the solution to the pandemic. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of European Journal of Women's Studies is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
ABSTRACT
In his last year in office, populist Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte faced the deadly surge of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 pandemic. His government continued to struggle with the health crisis despite implementing one of the most heavy-handed lockdowns in the world. In his final State of the Nation address, he trumpeted his administration’s “war on drugs” and ordered the military to hunt communist insurgents and “shoot them dead.” At the same time, he admitted that he has failed in his “war on corruption,” the second plank in his 2016 campaign platform. His admission foreshadowed the biggest corruption scandal of his administration. The Senate uncovered evidence of financial misuse, particularly for supplies from Pharmally Pharmaceutical, a business formed just months before securing billions of pesos in government supply contracts. The controversy has eroded Duterte’s popularity ratings, but he has retained high enough numbers to leverage political support in the upcoming 2022 presidential election and deflect impending International Criminal Court prosecution for his bloody drug war.
ABSTRACT
This article examines the Philippines' democracy under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte and assesses the ramifications of democratic decline for the future of the U.S.-Philippines alliance under the next administration.